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The purpose of this thesis is to check the effectiveness of monetary policy on 
macroeconomic indicators after the adoption of inflation targeting for randomly 
chosen 10 economies to fill the gap in the literature. For this purpose, the 
effectiveness of interest rates on output gap and inflation rates have been measured to 
compare the differences for pre and post targeting periods by evaluating VAR model 
analysis. The duration and magnitude of a shock is investigated by implementing 
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impulse response functions. Effectiveness on output gap is found out significant for 
Iceland, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Romania and Turkey and 
insignificant for Czech Republic, Republic of Serbia and the U.K. for pre-targeting 
period but significant for all economies for post-targeting period. Effectiveness on 
inflation has been found out significant for South Korea, Mexico, Romania and 
Turkey but insignificant for Czech Republic, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Republic of 
Serbia and the U.K. for pre-targeting. For post-targeting period, the findings have 
revealed effectiveness on inflation is significant for Czech Republic, Iceland, South 
Korea, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Republic of Serbia and the U.K.. 
Findings reveal that effectiveness of monetary policy on output gap has been 
relevant for all countries after the adoption of inflation targeting by making 
effectiveness on output gap more obvious. The similar conclusion holds for 
effectiveness on inflation rates for post-targeting (except Turkey and Romania) 
implying the evidence for effectiveness on macroeconomic indicators after the 
adoption of inflation targeting. 
Keywords: Inflation Targeting Regime, VAR Model, Impulse Response Function, 
Effectiveness of Monetary Policy, Output Gap. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
                    PARA POLĠTĠKASI ETKĠNLĠĞĠ  
  VE 
      ENFLASYON HEDEFLEMESĠ 
 
 
HUYUGÜZEL, Nurbanu 
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Bedri K. Onur TAġ 
 
  Ekim 2015 
 
 
Bu çalıĢma, farklı zamanlarda enflasyon hedefleme rejimini benimsemiĢ olup 
rasgele seçilmiĢ 10 ekonominin, bu rejimin benimsenmesinden sonraki dönemlerde 
para politikasının makroekonomik göstergeler üzerindeki etkinliğini kontrol ederek 
ilgili literatürdeki boĢluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, faiz oranlarının 
ekonomik çıktıdaki açık ve enflasyon oranları üzerindeki etkinliği, enflasyon 
hedeflemesi öncesi ve sonrası dönem arasındaki farkları kıyaslamak amacıyla VAR 
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Model analizi aracılığıyla incelenmiĢtir. Bu kapsamda, etki-tepki fonksiyonları 
uygulanarak faiz üzerindeki olası bir Ģokun ekonomik çıktı açığı ve enflasyon 
oranları üzerindeki etkisinin süresi ve büyüklüğü incelenmiĢtir. Ampirik bulgulara 
göre, enflasyon hedeflemesi öncesi dönemde, Çek Cumhuriyeti, Sırbistan ve BirleĢik 
Krallık hariç analize dahil edilen ekonomilerde para politikasının ekonomik çıktı 
açığı üzerindeki etkinliği %5 önem düzeyinde istatistiki olarak anlamlı bulunurken; 
hedeflemesi sonrası dönemde tüm ekonomilerde istatistiki olarak anlamlı sonuçlara 
ulaĢılmıĢtır. Enflasyon oranları üzerinde para politikasının etkinliğine dair ise 
hedefleme öncesi dönemde yalnızca Güney Kore, Meksika, Romanya ve Türkiye için 
istatistiki olarak anlamlı sonuçlara ulaĢılırken; hedefleme sonrası dönemde, Romanya 
ve Türkiye hariç analize katılan tüm ekonomilerde istatistiki olarak anlamlı sonuçlara 
ulaĢılmıĢtır.  
Bu sonuçlara göre hedefleme sonrası dönem için para politikasının ekonomik 
çıktı açığı üzerindeki etkinliği tüm ülkeler için anlamlı olup enflasyon hedefleme 
yaklaĢımının para politikasının ekonomik çıktı açığı üzerindeki etkinliğini daha da 
görünür hale getirmektedir. Analizde yer alan 10 ekonominin 8‟i için hedefleme 
öncesi dönemle kıyaslandığında, hedefleme sonrası dönemde benzer sonuçların para 
politikasının enflasyon oranları üzerindeki etkinliği için de geçerli olduğu sonucuna 
varılmıĢtır. Tüm bu bulgular, enflasyon hedefleme rejimi sonrasında para 
politikasının ekonomik çıktı açığı ve enflasyon oranları üzerinde belirgin bir 
etkinliğinin olduğuna dair ampirik bir bulgu olarak değerlendirilmiĢtir. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Enflasyon Hedefleme Rejimi, VAR Model Analizi, Etki Tepki 
Fonksiyonu, Para Politikası Etkinliği, Ekonomik Çıktı Açığı. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In our contemporary world, the main obligation of every Central Bank has 
been turned out to be the provision of stability in economics and assisting indirectly 
the other economic actors to ensure the stability in every aspect of economics. 
Although the stability is the main issue of every economy ranging from developed to 
developing economies, there is no single solution for sustaining the stability in every 
economy. Some economies have higher inflation and some others might have to deal 
with liquidity trap as in the case of Japan (Krugman et al., 1998). Therein Central 
Bank of any country should take the country-specific economic outlook into 
consideration when to evaluate monetary policies. 
Up until 21st century, the main responsibility of Central Banks has been the 
accomplishment and sustainment of low and stable inflation both in the short and 
long run. For this purpose, starting from Gold Standard to inflation targeting, many 
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different approaches and frameworks have been evaluated in retrospect (David and 
Doh, 2014). To begin with, the Gold Standard has been about fixing the value of 
national currency to the gold and it has been accepted that the national currency 
could be converted into gold (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1997). In practice, once 
the national currencies have been fixed in terms of Gold for every economy that has 
accepted the Gold Standard, this has also meant that exchange rates would be fixed. 
Thus the responsiveness of monetary authorities to the shocks has been dissolved. 
The most important effect of this on economy has been the high level of 
unemployment rates during the application of Gold Standard (Bordo, 1993). 
Once Gold Standard has been abandoned, the economies have been more 
focused on money supply after the World War I (Fischer, 1977). The monetary 
authorities have started targeting the growth rate of money supply. As the stable and 
low level of inflation has been the main purpose of monetary authorities ever since, it 
is assumed that the inflation could be stabilized and lowered by arranging and 
changing the money supply (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Unfortunately, the direct 
effect assumed to be between money supply and inflation has not been that much 
clear unlike it had been assumed by the economic theory. 
The fixation of exchange rate has been another strategy of monetary 
authorities in order to handle the high inflation. In the fix exchange rate regimes, 
many different methods have been applied but their common property has been 
fixing the value of national currency to a more internationally accepted currency such 
as US dollars (Eichenbaum and Evans, 1993). But economies that have applied fixed 
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exchange rate regimes have to apply policy approaches that might cause devaluation 
of national currency which in turn results in higher money supply and higher 
inflation (Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991). Because of this negative effect on 
inflation, today‟s economies have changed their exchange rate regime to floating 
regime. 
All of these different approaches and applications have been proved to 
generate negative effects on stability of inflation rates and they have been replaced 
by the new ones. Moreover, it was not possible to create a monetary policy tool 
applicable by Central Bank without damaging their credibility during the 
implementation of the previous monetary policy frameworks. Thus the monetary 
authorities started looking for a more flexible and more supportive inflation-
stabilizing policy approach. And this strategy has been assumed to be “inflation 
targeting”. Inflation targeting has been basically about announcement of inflation 
targets of Central Bank into the public (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997).  
The main feature of inflation targeting has been the focus on the future 
inflation rather than the past and current ones. More importantly, once the target is 
about the future inflation, this has also meant the presence of a credible Central Bank 
since setting targets for future requires commitment and reliability (Fuhrer, 1997). 
Therefore, an accountable and transparent Central Bank in its operations is a sine qua 
non of inflation targeting framework (Friedman, 2002). Another important feature of 
inflation targeting has been the direct specification about the inflation of the future 
but the other monetary tools and strategies have indirect effects on inflation and 
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therein it is not always possible to foresee their effects on future inflation. Through 
inflation targeting, the countries have tried to control the inflation rates at some 
extent. 
In practice, the inflation targeting has been carried out by trying to keep the 
inflation within a wider range rather than point target or a narrow range for inflation 
in order to give some space to Central Bank to respond to the shocks (Roger, 2009). 
In this way, it is also aimed to preserve the accountability and credibility of Central 
Bank at the same time. On the other hand, the price stability has been the main  
objective of inflation targeting as it is for all other monetary policy regimes. Based 
on all these properties of inflation targeting, this framework has been regarded as a 
policy approach that captures all the best properties of all different regimes 
(Bernanke et al., 1999). 
One of the first economies applying the inflation targeting was New Zealand 
at the beginning of 1990s (Pétursson, 2004). Today the number of economies 
applying inflation targeting regime has reached up to 27 (Caldentey and Vernengo, 
2013).  As the current studies find out empirical evidence for the success of inflation 
targeting regime in sustaining low and stable inflation rates and also its positive 
effects on economic outcome such as real growth rate; the number of economies 
applying inflation targeting regime has been increasing (Truman, 2003). Moreover, 
as the number of economies applying inflation targeting regime has been increasing, 
the inflation targeting has been one of the most popular research subject of economic 
literature as well. 
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Since 1990s, these various and numerous studies carried out have made 
tremendous contribution into the literature that has been analyzing the relation 
between inflation targeting and macroeconomic indicators. Some of these studies 
have not found any significant relation between inflation targeting regime and the 
macroeconomic performance of economies applying inflation targeting. On the other 
hand, some others have found out empirical evidence supporting that inflation 
targeting results in higher credibility of monetary authorities, less volatility in 
inflation and growth indicators and lower inflation and interest rates and no negative 
effect on economic growth, unemployment and all other economic criteria. The 
detailed analysis between inflation targeting and macroeconomic outlook has been 
carried out in the following chapters of literature review part of this study as well. 
Although there are many studies investigating the inflation targeting regime 
and its effect on economic parameters, there are just a few studies about the relation 
between inflation targeting and its effect on effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Therefore, this research investigates the effects of inflation targeting regime on 
monetary policy effectiveness in 10 different economies that have been adopting the 
inflation targeting by evaluating the Vector Auto-Regression model based 
methodology. In this study, it is expected that there would be no significant change 
on macroeconomic indicators if there is a shock on interest rates owing to the 
inflation targeting for the period after the effective date of inflation targeting regime. 
Moreover, it is expected that the duration of effects of shocks would be much limited 
to less number of periods under the inflation targeting regime. 
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This work consists of the following chapters : chapter two investigates and 
summarizes the findings of previous literature; chapter three provides brief but 
detailed information about inflation targeting applying economies that have been 
included in the empirical part of this study; chapter four provides information about 
the data and chapter five summarizes the methodology applied and chapter six 
displays results and findings and compares the results for each country and finally 
chapter seven concludes the whole study including the literature and the findings of 
the VAR models and impulse response functions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Monetary policy and fiscal policy have been the main policy approaches of 
the economies since 1929 Great Depression period after which the Keynesian 
economic policy approaches have been widely accepted (Bibow, 2013). Since then, 
fiscal policy has been about managing the budget of the economy and the monetary 
policy has been about the money supply of the economies. Unfortunately, within 
economic retrospect both have been used for the political interests and populist aims. 
Especially monetary policy has been evaluated for populist goals (Lippi, 2002). But 
1970s had been the turning point for the monetary policy evaluation for the 
economies after the Oil Crisis had burst (Kilian, 2008). Then the main focus of 
economies has been about how to decrease the inflation rates. 
Once the economic outlook in 2000s is investigated, the inflation rate is still 
not the only important problem of any economy, there are still many economies 
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dealing with high inflation, devaluation of national currency, trade deficits, current 
account deficits and low growth rates (Milanovich, 2014). Especially 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis has turned out to be a real economy problem rather than a simple 
sub-prime crisis. The distortions in the financial and banking system due to moral 
hazard, information asymmetries and problems relevant in real estate market have 
heavily influenced the economic growth of many economies including the U.S. and 
E.U. member economies (Crotty, 2009). As a result of this crisis, the economic 
instability and high unemployment in world economies have taken much more 
attention. But the previous literature has put much more importance on inflation rate 
as inflation rate is the key player in directing the public to have rational expectations 
about future of the economy. Here high inflation rates distort the expectations about 
the economy (Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2005). 
More importantly, since Great Depression the studies on monetary policy 
have revealed that the economy authorities cannot effectively use the monetary 
policy tools in a way that they always generate the desired outcomes. Furthermore, as 
the world economy has been more complicated and global through time, the 
effectiveness of national monetary policy has started to lose its importance. 
Liberalization of economies, openness to the global marketplace after World War II 
have all together made the world economies connected to each other (Rodrick, 2008). 
Thus the single monetary policy of any economy has been less effective on economic 
outlook of the economy. Eventually, all these radical changes taking place have made 
the Central Bank lose control over many indicators. Especially, the short run 
fluctuations have been more and more difficult to handle for any Central Bank. As a 
  
 
9 
   
result, Central Banks have started accepting the fact that there are not so many 
indicator they could control anymore (Woodford, 1995). 
Once this fact is accepted by most of the Central Banks in different 
economies, they have started focusing on the control of inflation rates especially in 
the long run as inflation rate is proved to be controlled in the long run. More 
importantly, since 1970s and especially in 1990s the moderate and high level of 
inflation rates are found out as being an influential distortion on the economic 
outlook (Zaleski, 1992). Literature on the effects of inflation rates has revealed 
inflation rate has an intermediate role in economy in order to reach to the 
macroeconomic targets. Through many empirical and theoretical works, high 
inflation rate is proved to be detrimental over the economic growth (Billi, 2011). 
Since high inflation rates distort the expectations of the public about the economy, as 
stated above. 
All of these discussions have put the importance of price stability forward 
(Wray, 1998). It is assumed that price stability does not only support the expectations 
but also indirectly support the effectiveness of monetary policy. Since once price 
stability is ensured, this also gives signals to the public about the credibility of 
Central Bank. Once the credibility of Central Bank has been ensured through the 
stabilization of price levels, it is hypothesized that the confidence of public to the 
Central Bank policies could be ensured in the long run. In this respect, the guarantee 
of price stability through inflation targeting framework plays a supportive and 
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intermediary role for Central Bank (Bernanke and Mihov, 1997). Therein, the other 
policy announcements of Central Bank could be more easily accepted by the public. 
Although it is assumed that inflation targeting is related to the price stability, 
the relation between inflation rates and macroeconomic indicators has gathered 
significance in the recent decades. The inflation targeting regime has put the main 
focus of Central Bank on the inflation rates as the inflation rates‟ effects on economic 
indicators become less clear because the economies are getting more and more 
integrated into the global marketplace and also the openness of economies has 
increased substantially since World War II. Besides, the recent studies have revealed 
that the Philips curve relation between inflation rates and unemployment is not valid 
all the time (Atkeson and Ohanian, 2001). Furthermore, there have been periods 
when both inflation rates and unemployment increase together. This would totally 
change the effectiveness of different monetary policy frameworks. 
What is more, the inflation targeting approach is evaluated as a framework to 
keep the economy away from the deflationary periods. Studies have revealed that the 
deflationary situation results in instability in the economy and financial system since 
the deflation distorts the interest rate relations in the economy (Aoki, 2012). As the 
percentage change in price levels decreases, the resulting deflation would result in 
increase in the real interest rates and if this deflationary period continues in the long 
run, the real interest rates start to decline. This results in distortions in the investment 
dynamics in the economy because the cost of long run oriented investments 
increases, when the real cost of investment increases as well through time due to the 
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decrease in inflation rates. In this respect, it is assumed that the inflation targeting 
framework could also be a better policy tool in order to prevent the economy from 
the situation of deflation. 
On the other hand, some other researchers could find any supporting evidence 
for this claim about the positive effectiveness of inflation targeting framework on the 
economic outlook (Johnson, 2002; Ball and Sheridan, 2004). Ardakani et al. (2015) 
specify that the main reason of difference among the findings of different studies is 
the selection of the countries for empirical analysis. Especially it is emphasized that 
the difference between targeting and non-targeting countries is not resulted from the 
ability to implement the inflation targeting but rather it is a problem of selection. 
Therefore, the comparison results between the performance of targeting and non-
targeting countries are more heterogeneous and ambiguous. Especially it is 
hypothesized that the difference in the degree of independence of Central Bank could 
be the main reason of why different countries generate different results once they 
implement inflation targeting at the same period (Kara, 2012). 
More importantly, the negative effects of evaluation of monetary policy for 
populist goals on future of the economy have revealed the importance of 
independency of Central Bank as the main monetary policy-setter (Cukierman, 
1992). Thus, one of the main issues regarding the monetary policy – which is about 
the credibility and reliability of money policy setter, Central Bank – has started 
taking attention. 
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The credibility of Central Bank has been especially critical for the 
persuasiveness of inflation targeting policy of the economy since the inflation 
targeting is about generating a target for the Central Bank and economy to reach in 
the future. If economic authorities want to realize the inflation targeting goal, then 
they should be more focused on how to make the public believe that Central Bank 
really focuses on inflation target set in advance (Fuhrer, 1997; Keefer and Stasavage, 
2003). The previous studies have revealed that inflation targeting policy approach 
cannot be succeeded as long as the credibility of Central Bank is not guaranteed 
(Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). Regarding this from perspective of public, it is 
clearly seen that Central Bank credibility is highly linked to the Central Bank freed 
from the interests of political groups. Therein the independency of Central Bank has 
been one of the essential pre-condition for the countries applying inflation targeting 
based monetary policy approach. 
As the independency of Central Bank has been one of the sine qua non of 
inflation targeting, the actual application of inflation targeting has differentiated 
among different economies (Burdekin et al., 2004; Gonçalves and Salles, 2008). The 
inflation targeting, as specified above, is about setting and announcing the future 
inflation target in advance but for how long and in what range the inflation has been 
targeted has been various in application. Although inflation targeting requires a 
medium or long range policy period, some economies such as the U.K. have chosen 
narrower ranges for the inflation target (Taylor and Davradakis, 2006). A much wider 
range setting has been recommended as the realized inflation might fall below or 
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above the targeted range as it has happened in the case of Turkey (Güney and Ceylan, 
2014). 
Some others have argued that the inflation targeting in the short run might 
have negative outcomes on the real variables of macroeconomics such as 
unemployment rate and output, economic growth, based on Rational Expectations 
Theory (Svensson, 1999). Rational Expectations Theory implies money is only 
neutral in the medium and/or long run but may not be in the short run. Thus inflation 
targeting in the short run might disrupt the balance in the real economy. Therefore 
some has suggested inflation targeting in the long run range and in a more gradual 
way cannot result in imbalance on economy (Bernanke et al., 1999). Regarding 
setting inflation target, especially targeting high level of inflation change, the long 
run focus has been heavily recommended. 
 As inflation targeting is more of a general attitude with many different 
implementation methods (Seyfried and Bremmer, 2003), Central Bank is responsible 
for fulfillment of inflation target but there is no clear-cut methodology how they 
should reach to this target. Therefore Central Bank could have use more than one 
policy tool for inflation targeting because the goal now is more certain and clear-cut, 
they should take many other relevant variables into consideration as there are many 
factors affecting inflation in the short and also long run.  Therefore, there is not any 
guideline for the effective usage of inflation targeting yet. The different outcomes 
obtained during the inflation targeting regime also support this hypothesis (Ball and 
Sheridan, 2004). As inflation target is an issue of future economy, the path to the 
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inflation targeting is based on uncertainty and expectations of the public and other 
relevant economic actors about the future. This also causes the lack of a guideline 
that works for every economy. Therein, it is suggested that inflation targeting in a 
more flexible and gradual attitude, when the targeting involves in high rates of 
decline in inflation, could be a better policy approach (Bernanke et al., 2001). The 
long run focus of inflation targeting also implies a more flexible regime that could 
provide some space for the Central Bank when controlling the inflation rates. Indeed, 
Walsh (2009) has concluded in his work that there is an issue of “flexible inflation 
targeting regime” in the recent periods. This more flexible attitude implies that 
Central Bank cares about the actualization of the inflation target but this does not 
mean Central Bank would not take the real economic indicators into consideration. 
Therefore, today‟s Central Banks that apply inflation targeting are more focused on a 
more balanced and flexible inflation targeting framework, which try to off-balance 
the possible negative outcomes on macroeconomic indicators. In this way, also 
Central Bank could preserve their credibility and reliability in case the actual target 
cannot be achieved. 
Furthermore, the inflation targeting in practice could require real commitment 
to the target set in advance and the Central Bank authorities make official 
announcement in public about this or they might just choose to make “cheap talk” 
about their targeting policy (Stein, 1989). Put this in other words, how Central Bank 
focuses on inflation targeting and how they signal their commitment to the public 
may differ. Based on these differences, Kuttner and Posen (1999) have specified 
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three inflation setting framework: untrusted discretionary, strictly conservative and 
trusted OSCR (Optimal State Contingent Rule). 
First of all “untrusted discretionary” framework is more related to the “cheap 
talk” implying inflation targeting is more about setting the target in an informal way 
without putting real dedication to the target forward (Kuttner and Posen, 1999). On 
the other hand, “strictly conservative” framework is just the opposite of “untrusted 
discretionary” framework as it is more about official announcement of target and 
setting strict rules for the framework. The third framework – OSCR – is more of a 
framework between these two extremes. Within OSCR framework, the Central Bank 
sets the target in a range so that once the target is not actualized, the credibility of 
Central Bank would not be harmed seriously (Kotlán and Navrátil, 2003; Seyfried 
and Bremmer, 2003). In this way, it is assumed that the Central Bank could also 
preserve its credibility even in case of a shock since they could still continue to show 
their dedication to the target as they respond to the shock within the set range. 
Although the outcomes and implementation methods of inflation targeting 
regimes for different countries have been various, the main goals of inflation 
targeting framework have been common for almost all of the targeting countries 
(Ardakani et al., 2015). First of all, the inflation targeting is future-oriented monetary 
policy framework and therefore the shaping and shifting the expectations of public 
about the future inflation rates is involved (Bofinger, 2000). By this way, the Central 
Bank could direct the market and the public towards the targeted inflation rate and 
this could assist the Central Bank to respond the shocks in a more proper and 
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efficient way. Therefore, the effects of shocks on the monetary policy would stay 
limited. Moreover, the inflation targeting is a future-oriented strategy, as specified 
before, therefore the public would see and evaluate the performance of Central Bank 
in case of lowering the inflation (Roger and Stone, 2005). Once Central Bank 
achieves to reach to the targeted inflation rate, this would signal positive outlook of 
Central Bank and by leveraging this, Central Bank could implement overall monetary 
policy more efficiently in a way that the market trusts on Central Bank and their 
commitment to future policies (Rogoff, 1985). More importantly, the public could 
have more reliable and correct information about the targets and goals of Central 
Bank (Blinder, 1999). Thus, the transparency in the monetary policy could be 
sustained. Transparency could also assist the Central Bank to receive the support of 
the public and to be a more credible authority of the economy. 
Additionally, the inflation targeting regime is assumed to stabilize the 
economic outlook in the long run (Clarida et al., 1998). In economic sense, the 
inflation targeting helps the Central Bank to make the economic growth as the 
fluctuations on the output could be less and the volatility on economic growth could 
be kept within desired limits. With regards to the economic fluctuations, the 
provision of trust and reliability in the market could also assist the economic 
authorities and Central Bank to respond to the output shocks in a more efficient way 
due to the framework of inflation targeting (Geraats, 2002; Mankiw and Reis, 2003). 
Indirectly, the inflation targeting regime is more likely to play an intermediate role on 
the overall economy by directing the market and the public towards the desired 
targets of economic authorities. 
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Although there are different approaches in application of inflation targeting 
for common goals, as discussed above, many studies have provided empirical 
evidence suggesting that the inflation targeting approach does not much matter as 
long as dedication to the target and making the public believe the dedication of 
Central Bank to the target guarantees the fulfillment of target (Creel and Hubert, 
2015). More importantly, this has been implemented as there is actually no need for a 
very strict rule setting regarding the inflation targeting. Based on this it has been 
suggested the focus on variables that might affect the future inflation rather than the 
current one could be more favorable for inflation targeting of the Central Bank 
(Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). Therein, a more future-oriented approach rather 
than only considering today‟s inflation has been recommended. As a result, the 
findings of previous studies have revealed that this kind of an approach actually 
works for both developed and also for developing economies (Öztürk, 2009). 
Although there has been some debate about there is actually a new regime 
change for Central Bank or not, the studies have revealed that since 1990s Central 
Banks that have announced adopting inflation targeting regime have been much more 
successful in decreasing inflation in a meaningful way once compared to the previous 
regimes (Bernanke et al., 2001; Rose, 2007; Öztürk, 2009). More significantly, it is 
concluded the stability at low inflation rates could also limit the effects of shocks on 
output. But the studies regarding relation between inflation targeting and economic 
outlook is limited. 
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Since 1990s, the studies about success and/or failure of inflation targeting 
have provided empirical evidence supporting the success of inflation targeting in 
generating price stability (Johnson, 2002; Kim and Park, 2006). Especially, it is 
found out that the countries that have implemented inflation targeting regime 
properly and continuously have experienced lower inflation rates after the adoption 
of inflation targeting regime. Mishkin (2000) also has asserted the inflation targeting 
countries have experienced lower inflation rates beyond the expectations. For 
example, the U.K., as being one of the first countries adopting inflation targeting 
regime, has experienced both lower and also more stable inflation after starting to 
target the inflation rates in advance. 
Indeed, it is found out that the inflation targeting countries have been much 
more prone to the shocks and the effects of shocks have been also more temporary. 
For example, Bernanke et al. (1999) have concluded that inflation targeting regime 
has assisted the shocks and policy changes into the economy by keeping the 
inflationary responses to those shocks. Svensson (1997) has also discussed that more 
stable and low levels of inflation could help economy authorities to move to the 
economy at a more stable growth level. Based on all those empirical findings, 
international and regional economy authorities have also started recommending the 
adoption of inflation targeting regime as the main monetary policy. 
But there are also some contradictory or mixed findings regarding the direct 
effect of inflation targeting on lowering inflation and generating higher economic 
output. In one of those studies, Ball and Sheridan (2004) have investigated 20 OECD 
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countries. 7 of those 20 OECD countries were adopting the inflation targeting and the 
remaining were not adopting this regime in the period of their study. They have 
found out empirical evidence supporting the mixed performance among those 
inflation targeting and non-targeting OECD countries. More importantly, they have 
concluded that there is no statistically significant superior performance of targeting 
countries in terms of real economic indicators such as output and employment 
because there have been examples of superior economic performance among both 
targeting and non-targeting countries. These findings are interpreted as there might 
be some other additional reasons for superior economic performance of targeting 
countries. 
Some other works have concluded that the inflation targeting regime has been 
more supportive and effective in lowering and stabilizing inflation rates for 
developing economies rather than it has been for developed economies (Savastano et 
al., 1997; Lin and Ye, 2009). In this regard, it is asserted that inflation targeting 
regime generates some kind of catching-up effect for developing economies 
(Neumann and von Hagen, 2002). In this respect, high inflation countries have seen 
positive change on the stability of inflation rates after adopting inflation targeting 
regime but still there is no empirical evidence stating that all those positive change on 
inflation rates of those countries is just the reason of inflation targeting regime. It is 
discussed that there might be some other reasons for the lower and more stable 
inflation rates. 
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In another work, Muscatelli et al. (2002) have investigated the forward-
looking interest rate reaction functions for the countries that have recently adopted 
inflation targeting regime. As a result, they have found out that the initial effect of 
adopting inflation targeting regime on interest rate policy has been little and less than 
expected. More importantly, they have concluded that there is no significant change 
in the responsiveness of monetary policy onto the expectations about inflation after 
adopting inflation targeting regime. In this respect, it is argued that the effects of 
inflation targeting on macroeconomic outlook would be seen in the long run rather 
than short run. 
Regarding the effects of inflation targeting framework on real output, the 
immediate studies have not been able to find out significant and supporting evidence 
for the positive effect of inflation targeting regime (Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 1999; 
Aizenmann et al., 2011). As stated above, targets and goals of inflation targeting 
regime are long-term oriented and therefore it is assumed that this might be the 
reason of why the studies carried out right after the adoption of inflation targeting 
would not generate desired outcome on real economy indicators. Therefore, the 
studies carried out about the changes on output gaps could not find significant effect 
of inflation targeting on output stabilization (Huthison and Walsh, 1998). 
In addition to the short versus long term effects, as a result of the differences 
on the application of inflation targeting framework, the researchers have concluded 
mixed results. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Mihov and Rose (2008), Ruge-
Marcia (2003) and some others have asserted the presence of empirical evidence 
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supporting the fact that inflation targeting framework is significantly effective on the 
economic outlook in a positive way. In their work, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2001) have regarded the inflation targeting framework as an amazing approach for 
the monetary policy and a big step in the development of the Central Bank. They 
have concluded that inflation targeting is an assisting approach for the Central Banks 
to take control of inflation rate fluctuations and to improve the economic outlook. 
But they have also put emphasis on the differences among the different application 
methods of inflation targeting regimes. 
In another work, Rose (2007) takes the attention to the duration for 
implementation of inflation targeting regime. It is claimed that since 1990s, none of 
the inflation targeting country has abandoned the inflation targeting framework, 
although in the past many other monetary policy regimes had been abandoned by 
different countries and those other regimes would not last long. In the same respect, 
Mihov and Rose (2008) have regarded this long-lasting situation of inflation 
targeting regime as quite unbelievable. This is considered as the proof for the 
sustainability and effectiveness of inflation targeting. Since many countries ranging 
from developed to developing economies have tried many different approaches as the 
monetary policy since World War I. More interestingly, Mihov and Rose (2008) also 
puts attention on the fact that previous monetary frameworks that have lasted longer 
have also performed better than the new ones. Based on this assumption, the long-
lasting implementation periods of inflation targeting is regarded as a remarkable 
result as the inflation targeting regime is considered as quite a new regime. 
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In a similar way, Thornton (2012) has emphasized that since 1990s the 
researchers have been skeptical about the effectiveness of inflation targeting regime 
since they have asserted that Central Bank indeed would not be able to control the 
inflation rates by themselves just by making announcement and arranging the 
monetary policy tools in order to keep inflation rates stable and at low levels. But 
from 1990s to the end of first decade of 21st century, the inflation targeting 
economies at least would not be worse off once compared to the non-targeting 
countries and there are at least six periods needed to get the positive influence of the 
inflation targeting (Batini and Haldane, 1999). More importantly, at the beginning it 
was claimed that the political interests would not allow the Central Bank to be more 
focused on targeting inflation rates in the long run. However, the results and 
continuation of implementation of inflation targeting all imply that targeting 
economies still continue to target the future inflation rates in advance as the main 
monetary policy framework and indeed the actual inflation has been conceptualized 
much below the target inflation rates (Ruge-Murcia, 2003). 
Regarding the empirical evidences supporting the effectiveness of inflation 
targeting regime, different from similar studies, Walsh (2009) have asserted that 
inflation targeting may or may not reduce the volatility on the real economic outlook 
depending on the implementation of inflation targeting framework based on how the 
inflation targeting assists the Central Bank to achieve the credibility. 
Although the success of inflation targeting depends on duration and some 
other factors, the empirical results generally imply the positive and meaningful 
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effectiveness of inflation targeting regime. In one of the more recent studies, 
Gonçalves and Salles (2008) have carried out the empirical analysis of inflation 
targeting effectiveness on volatility of GDP growth in real terms in order to compare 
the performance of targeting and non-targeting economies. It is found out that the 
targeting economies have experienced less volatility once compared to the non-
targeting economies for the periods after the adoption of targeting regime. 
To summarize the empirical studies that provide empirical evidence for the 
effectiveness of inflation targeting, it could be concluded that there are some obvious 
evidence for the effectiveness of inflation targeting regime. Fraga et al. (2004) 
especially emphasizes that getting empirical evidence for the effectiveness for 
developing economies is much easier than it has been for developed economies. But 
the findings have been heavily heterogeneous among different economies regarding 
the effectiveness of inflation targeting regime (Lin and Ye, 2009). On the other hand, 
it is seen that the increasing food and raw material prices makes the inflation 
targeting impossible to be achieved and indeed the inflation targeting might distort 
the macroeconomic outlook (Stiglitz, 2008). Since Stiglitz defines the inflation 
targeting as a rough policy rule that implies the interest rates should be risen as long 
as the inflation is above the targeted level. 
All those studies reveal that inflation targeting has started being used heavily 
by many countries at an increasing rate in 21st century regardless of the targeting has 
been or will be successful or not. Although inflation targeting has been the main 
concern of Central Bank in many countries since 1990s, inflation rate as a nominal 
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variable would not be the main target of any economy before. The main concern of 
macroeconomic authorities has been mostly about the indicators of real economy 
such as economic growth, unemployment rates, export-import balance and trade 
deficit. But the previous literature has proven that although the real economy 
indicators require the highest level of attention, the inflation targeting assists the 
realization of the stability in the economy and also finance through generating price 
stability in the economy (Orphanides, A., & Wieland, 2000). Since, inflation 
targeting provides an economic environment where the price stability could also be 
sustained. 
In conclusion, as inflation targeting has been applied at most for the last 25 
years and, as specified above, the inflation targeting is more of a long run concern; 
the most of the studies focus on effectiveness of inflation targeting but limited 
number of studies focus on how the macroeconomic outlook has changed after 
inflation targeting. More importantly, the findings of different studies also contradict 
with each other due to the different implementation of regime among different 
economies and economic outlook differences between developed and developing 
economies. In order to fill this gap in the literature about the more specific effects of 
inflation targeting on macroeconomic outlook of economies, this study has focused 
on how the price and output parameters respond to the shocks to the interest rates 
before and after the inflation targeting regime period. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
ECONOMIES ADOPTED THE 
    INFLATION TARGETING 
 
 
 
In this empirical study, 10 out of 27 inflation targeting countries have been 
examined from the perspective of effectiveness of inflation targeting regime on the 
macroeconomic outlook of each of those countries. 
 
3.1. Czech Republic 
 
Czech Republic has adopted the inflation targeting regime since the end of 
1997. The main reason for the monetary policy shift in 1998 has been the exchange 
rate crisis of 1997. After the crisis, Central Bank of Czech Republic adopted the 
strict inflation targeting regime but through time they have adopted a more flexible 
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and internationally accepted guideline of inflation targeting framework. Since the 
adoption of inflation targeting regime, Czech Republic has seen tremendous change 
on the inflation rates such that the inflation rates fell from around 12% levels to 5% 
levels between 1997 and 2002. More importantly, the study of Kotlan and Navratil 
(2003) has provided empirical evidence supporting that adoption of inflation 
targeting has made significant contributions on the stabilization of the overall 
economic outlook. 
 
3.2. Iceland 
 
Iceland has started adopting the inflation targeting framework since 2001 but 
as a small-sized economy, Iceland has experienced serious problems during 2008 
Global Financial Crisis. Indeed, the inflation targeting framework of Iceland has 
been blamed as the main reason of why Global crisis has influenced Iceland in such a 
serious way (Danielsson, 2008). It is claimed that Iceland would not adopt a flexible 
inflation targeting regime and as a small economy Iceland has always tried to keep 
increasing the interest rates in order to keep the inflation rates within targeted range. 
But firms and households have preferred borrowing in foreign currency in Iceland 
due to the high interest rates prevailing in the local economy. Eventually, this would 
influence the exchange rates and indeed the firms and households even have carried 
out higher level of investment that has supported the economic growth even more by 
resulting in higher inflation rates. Therefore, Central Bank of Iceland has never been 
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able to keep the inflation rates within the range and also interest rates were rising too. 
As a result of this, inflation targeting framework would not generate the desired 
outcome for the economy of Iceland and the main reason of this is regarded as the 
higher share of foreign currency in the monetary supply of Iceland. 
 
3.3. South Korea 
 
South Korea is one of the early-adopters of inflation targeting regime as they 
have adopted the targeting framework since 1998. The inflation targeting regime has 
been quite successful in South Korea in decreasing the inflation rate itself and the 
volatilities as well (Sanchez, 2010). Indeed, the inflation targeting regime of South 
Korea has been regarded as extraordinarily successful. Since 1999, the inflation rates 
have been less volatile and stayed at low levels in South Korea. But the application 
of regime has differed such that South Korea monetary policy has put the highest 
attendance onto the price stability by allowing the interest rates to move smoothly. 
More importantly, the main aim of inflation targeting regime of South Korea has not 
been the stabilization of the economic output but the stability of price levels. In this 
respect, this approach of South Korean Central Bank has been regarded as a more 
gradual application of inflation targeting. This implies that inflation stability is the 
initial and most important target and then output stability comes next. 
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3.4. Mexico 
Mexico has started adopting the inflation targeting regime since 1999 and the 
transition to the inflation targeting framework has been slow and gradual in a form of 
step by step. More importantly, like other Latin countries Mexico has also applied 
the inflation targeting regime only when the inflation rates have been much higher 
than their stationary levels. Today Mexico has been applying a full inflation targeting 
framework in a way that the exchange rates are allowed to fully float and Central 
Bank credibility is ensured and the low and stable inflation rate is the main target of 
Central Bank. As a result, Mexico‟s inflation rates have fallen significantly but they 
have stayed at much higher levels in the medium run (Schmidt-Hebbel et al., 2002). 
 
3.5. Norway 
 
Norway has been one of the late adopters of inflation targeting regime. 
Norway has started adopting the inflation targeting framework since 2001 and 
therefore, there are not so many studies about the effectiveness of inflation targeting 
in the case Norway. But the main purpose of inflation targeting regime in Norway 
has been the stabilization of inflation rates at low levels rather than the price stability 
(Roger, 2009). As having a more stable economy, Norway has targeted the inflation 
rates at the levels of 1-3% range. 
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3.6. Poland 
Poland has started adopting the inflation targeting regime since 1998 and it is 
claimed that the overall economic outlook in Poland has been enough to support the 
applicability of inflation targeting framework. Especially, economic authorities of 
Poland has limited the scope of fiscal policies by generating a more balanced 
government budget. In this way, the pressure on the inflation rates and interest rates 
has been aimed to be smoothed and freed. In order to solve the nominal rigidities, 
wage indexation has been adopted (Gottschalk and Moore, 2001). However, the 
changing the focus from the exchange rates to interest rates for the monetary policy 
content has required Poland to increase the time horizon of the inflation targeting 
framework. As specified above, the inflation targeting has been a more radical shift 
on the monetary policy of Poland than it has been for other economies. Therefore, a 
more long term oriented inflation targeting has been suggested for Poland. 
 
3.7. Romania 
 
Since 2005, Romania has been adopting the inflation targeting regime. 
Romania has been one of the late adopters of inflation targeting but their economic 
perspective and targets have been more diverse and also difficult to handle. There 
has been high level of pressure on monetary policy of Romania because there have 
been demands of European Union for the membership of Romania and therefore, 
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high level of economic growth and dealing with the problem of disinflation have 
been asked by European Union (Daianu and Kallai, 2008). Under those 
circumstances, Romania has also adopted the inflation targeting in order to create 
stability in both inflation rates and output levels. As the economy of Romania has 
been more integrated into the global marketplace, their economy has been also more 
sensitive and vulnerable to the shocks as well. As a developing economy, Romania 
has also issues about labor market, rigidities and other related issues. Therefore, a 
more short term oriented inflation targeting regime has been recommended in the 
case of Romania in order to leave space for Central Bank to deal with many other 
unsettled issues such as labor market dynamics, exchange rates and others. 
 
3.8. Republic of Serbia 
 
Serbia has been the latest adopter of inflation targeting regime among all 27 
countries. As it has been relevant in the case of Romania, Serbia has also had to deal 
with some other monetary policy issues. Especially it is seen that the exchange rates 
have presented important barriers for the implementation of inflation targeting. More 
importantly, the global economy has forced Republic of Serbia to be more inclined to 
inflation rate stability focused rather than keeping the exchange rates as the main 
monetary policy focus (Josifidis et al., 2009). Therefore, Republic of Serbia has 
adopted the inflation targeting regime together with the floating exchange rate 
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regime in 2009. As Serbia has recently adopted the inflation targeting, there is not 
much empirical study to generate meaningful conclusions. 
 
3.9. Turkey 
 
Turkey started adopting the inflation targeting regime in 2006. Turkey had 
experienced high level of inflation since 70s to 2000s. But after 2000s the inflation 
rates have moved to much lower points. And after 2006 Central Bank has announced 
the inflation targets to be achieved in the medium and the long run but in some 
periods the actual inflation rates have been above the target range and in some other 
periods the actual rates have stayed below the target range indeed (Güney and 
Ceylan, 2014). Although there has been a serious decline on the output growth at 
least in the short run, this issue has been regarded as an undesired outcome of Global 
Financial crisis. On the other hand, it is found out that output volatility has declined 
after the inflation targeting regime adopted once compared to the period before the 
adoption of inflation targeting. 
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3.10. The United Kingdom 
 
As an early adopter of inflation targeting regime, the monetary policy 
evolution of the United Kingdom has followed a step-by-step process. Once the U.K. 
has adopted the inflation targeting regime since 1992, the political system has started 
focusing on the credibility and independence of Central Bank in 1997. Eventually, in 
1998 the main objective of the Central Bank has been formalized. According to this, 
Central Bank has been kept responsible for the provision of price stability through 
the implementation of inflation targeting initially at the level of 2.5% (Taylor and 
Davradakis, 2006). And the volatilities over this target has been tried to be avoided. 
As a result, the findings have revealed that the U.K. has experienced price stability 
together with higher growth rates after the adoption of inflation targeting framework. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
                        DATA 
 
 
 
The main methodology of this study has been Vector Auto-Regression Model 
analysis for the following countries separately: Czech Republic, Iceland, South 
Korea, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Romania, Republic of Serbia, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom. In order to see the effects of inflation targeting on effectiveness of 
monetary policy, four variables have been taken into consideration: inflation rate, 
interest rate, price index and output gap. Monthly CPI based percentage change series 
is evaluated for the calculation of interest rates. Money market rates‟ monthly series 
have been used for the interest rate variable for all countries except Turkey and 
Norway. In the case of Turkey and Norway, Central Bank policy rate is used as 
interest rate variable. Data about the output gap has been calculated by using the 
monthly industrial production data through the application of Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
The industrial inputs price index that also takes agricultural raw materials and metals 
price indices has been used as the price index variable where the year of 2005 has 
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been accepted as base year. The data for inflation rates, interest rates and output gap 
for every country included in the analysis have been retrieved from the IFS database 
of IMF. Data for the price index calculations have been retrieved from GEM database 
of IMF official website. 
Among 27 countries that apply the inflation targeting regime, only 10 
countries out of 27 countries have been included into the analysis content because 
there is only high frequency data for only those 10 countries in IFS database. 
Moreover, there is not enough data for some other countries in the IMF databases and 
therefore those countries are not included into the analysis. Therein those ten 
countries have been taken into consideration. In order to see the effects of inflation 
targeting on monetary policy effectiveness, for each country included in the analysis 
the data is split into two groups: one period before and on period after the effective 
date of inflation targeting regime. 
Although many economies have started adopting inflation targeting regime, 
there has been disagreement about determining the exact date of when the targeting 
countries actually started to implement the inflation targeting regime. Since the 
inflation targeting regime implementation has been generally implemented step by 
step in practice. This implies different researchers have set different dates for the 
adoption date for the inflation targeting as those different researchers take different 
aspects of inflation targeting as the turning point (Pétursson, 2004). Therefore, it 
might not be clear cut to specify the exact timing of the adoption of the inflation 
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targeting framework. But here the table below is constructed based on the dates and 
years specified in the work of Pétursson (2004) and Hammond (2012). 
The list of the inflation targeting date for the countries included in this study 
is such that: 
Table 1: The Inflation Targeting Dates of Countries 
 
COUNTRY NAME 
INFLATION TARGETING 
STARTING DATE 
1 Czech Republic January 1998 
2 Iceland March 2001 
3 South Korea April 1998 
4 Mexico January 1999 
5 Norway March 2001 
6 Poland October 1998 
7 Romania August 2005 
8 Serbia, Republic of January 2009 
9 Turkey January 2006 
10 United Kingdom October 1992 
 
Also, the available range and number of observations of the series money 
market rate, CPI (%) change, industrial production and price (%) change for each 
country in our analysis can be seen in the Table 2 
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MONEY MARKET RATE 
SERIES 
CPI (%)  CHANGE 
SERIES 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
SERIES 
PRICE INDEX (% ) 
CHANGE SERIES 
COUNTRY 
NAME 
START END 
NUMBER 
OF OBS. 
START END 
NUMBER 
OF OBS. 
START END 
NUMBER 
OF OBS. 
START END 
NUMBER 
 OF OBS. 
Czech 
Republic 
1993M1 2015M3 267 1994M1 2015M3 255 1993M1 2015M2 266 1981M1 2015M8 416 
Iceland 1986M11 2015M3 341 1984M1 2015M3 375 1998M1 2012M12 180 1981M1 2015M8 416 
South Korea 1976M8 2015M1 462 1971M1 2015M3 531 1980M1 2015M2 422 1981M1 2015M8 416 
Mexico 1981M4 2015M3 408 1958M1 2015M3 687 1970M1 2015M2 542 1981M1 2015M8 416 
Norway 1964M1 2015M3 615 1957M1 2015M3 684 1957M1 2015M1 699 1981M1 2015M8 416 
Poland 1990M12 2015M3 292 1989M1 2015M3 315 1985M1 2015M2 362 1981M1 2015M8 416 
Romania 1995M1 2015M2 242 1991M10 2015M2 281 1990M5 2015M02 298 1981M1 2015M8 416 
Serbia, 
Republic of 
2005M8 2015M2 115 1995M2 2015M3 247 1994M1 2015M02 254 1981M1 2015M8 416 
Turkey 1999M10 2015M3 186 1970M1 2015M3 543 1985M1 2014M12 360 1981M1 2015M8 416 
United 
Kingdom 
1972M1 2015M2 518 1989M1 2015M3 315 1957M1 2015M2 698 1981M1 2015M8 416 
Table 2: The Available Range and Number of Observations of All Series 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
              METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
The empirical analysis of the data has been carried out in those steps: 
- Initially the stationarity of time-series data has been checked in order to 
carry out VAR analysis with the raw data. The stationarity of data means the variance 
and mean of the time-series data does not change and stays constant. But if the data is 
not stationary, this means through time the mean and variance of data is not constant. 
The non-stationarity of data must be checked in order to see if the series are trend-
dependent. If there is a trend in the data, this affects the reliability of data and first 
the trend effect must be eliminated. In this work, the non-stationarity problem has 
been discovered for some series and therefore the first order differences of the data 
have been used for the empirical analysis. 
The following table shows the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root 
Test for all series after taking first order difference: 
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Table 3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Results 
 
 
CPI % Change Money Market Output Gap 
Price Index % 
Change 
 Country Pre IT Post IT Pre IT Post IT Pre IT Post IT Pre IT Post IT 
 Czech Rep. 
 
-5.653498 
 
-6.683583 
 
-7.279209 
 
-7.951653 
 
-8.240647 
 
-3.724478 
 
-6.228963 
 
-9.504010 
 Iceland 
 
-6.985514 
 
-7.326295 
 
-10.37162 
 
-13.43247 
 
-7.816426 
 
-4.980731 
 
-7.103399 
 
-8.599737 
 South Korea 
 
-4.912533 
 
-10.48298 
 
-15.42044 
 
-6.647066 
 
-3.122811 
 
-5.410180 
 
-6.347865 
 
-9.418701 
 Mexico 
 
-6.469213 
 
-4.596880 
 
-10.91754 
 
-9.823058 
 
-6.237554 
 
-3.320863 
 
-6.598208 
 
-9.182780 
 Norway 
 
-9.887763 
 
-4.848631 
 
-17.38710 
 
-12.08202 
 
-25.86421 
 
-4.309719 
 
-7.103399 
 
-8.599737 
 Poland 
 
-3.755608 
 
-8.902658 
 
-8.816351 
 
-6.250914 
 
-3.712296 
 
-3.654351 
 
-6.533745 
 
-9.266214 
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 Table 3 (continued) 
 Romania 
 
-8.907866 
 
-6.189809 
 
-10.25534 
 
-10.04664 
 
-4.436855 
 
-3.068125 
 
-7.923868 
 
-7.103500 
 Serbia Rep. 
 
-6.504333 
 
-5.129397 
 
-3.812771 
 
-4.505247 
 
-4.092958 
 
-3.200497 
 
-7.424875 
 
-5.196400 
 Turkey 
 
-9.805061 
 
-7.051872 
 
-6.179630 
 
-2.358024 
 
-10.18454 
 
-7.377748 
 
-7.998794 
 
-6.955939 
 United Kingdom 
 
-5.984210 
 
-14.37556 
 
-15.50635 
 
-24.02453 
 
-6.145294 
 
-3.926573 
 
-4.569268 
 
-10.91208 
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VAR methodology has been chosen in this analysis because VAR model 
based methodology captures the interdependencies among different variables. In this 
regard, VAR model analysis provides a multivariate analysis basis. 
- Based on the initial results of chosen methodology, the issue of “price-
puzzle” has been come across. Price puzzle problem occurs because of the 
information lack of the public about the announcements of the Central Bank. In other 
words, the announcements of Central Bank about the inflation targeting may not 
generate the desired outcome immediately in the short run and the information 
asymmetry between Central Bank and the public in the short run might cause 
increase in inflation expectations and inflation itself although Central Bank applies 
contractionary monetary policy and this situation is called “price-puzzle”. Prize 
puzzle occurs when Central Bank prefers applying contractionary monetary policy, 
the interest rate starts increasing and this increase in interest rates is perceived as a 
signal for the increase in the future inflation rates. In order to deal with the problem 
of price-puzzle, the data of price index has been also included into the VAR models 
(Hanson, 2004). VAR model methodology and impulse response functions based 
methodology have been applied in this analysis because the similar studies 
investigating the effectiveness of monetary policy on the economic outlook have 
evaluated the same methodology (Paramanik and Kamaiah, 2014). 
- Finally the impulse response functions and graphical analysis has been 
carried out in order to see the effects of interest rate shocks on inflation and output 
gap through time. 
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The impulse response functions on the VAR models have been calculated 
based on ordering of Cholesky decomposition. Based on this ordering method, the 
variables assumed to be interdependent to each other are ordered in a way that the 
ordering provides the variable affecting the others at the most and affected by others 
at the least (Loehlin, 1996). In order to decide the number of lags, the SC (Scwartz 
Criterion) has been used and the optimal number of lags has been calculated as lag of 
two periods. Based on those, The VAR models have the following form: 
 
[
    
    
    
    
]  =      +      [
      
      
      
      
] +      [
      
      
      
      
]+            (4.1) 
 
Where     ,     ,     ,  and      represents the macroeconomic indicators 
chosen for this study which are: output gap, inflation rates, price index and interest 
rates and        ,        represent first and second lag of related variable. Moreover, 
α represents the (4    vector of constants and A and B are (4    coefficient 
matrices. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
       RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
 
To begin with, the descriptive analysis of the macroeconomic indicators has 
been carried out. Then the VAR model analysis and graphical analysis of impulse 
response functions have been investigated. In the initial phase of the VAR analysis, 
the effects of money market rates on inflation rates and output have been calculated 
for every country included into the analysis. Based on the findings, the problem of 
price-puzzle as there has been a positive association between inflation rates and 
interest rates. Therefore, the price index percentage change has been also included 
into the VAR model analysis in order to remove the effects of price-puzzle onto the 
findings. Eventually, the ordering of the variables has been such that based on the 
ordering of Cholesky decomposition: output gap, CPI % change, price index % 
change and money market rate. Based on this ordering, the findings imply that the 
output gap is the variable that influences the other all three variables at most but also 
output gap is the variable that is least influenced by the all other three variables. As 
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also specified above, the optimal number of lags has been determined as two periods 
lags based on Scwartz Criterion. 
6.1. Descriptive Analysis 
 
For the three macroeconomic variables (i.e. output gap, inflation rates and 
interest rates) that have been taken into consideration in the empirical part of the 
study, the descriptive analysis has been carried out in this part of the study. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Pre and Post Targeting Periods for the 
Variable of Inflation Rates 
 
 
PRE-TARGETING 
PERIOD 
POST-TARGETING 
PERIOD 
COUNTRY 
NAME 
IT 
ADOPTING 
DATE 
CPI 
CHANGE 
(%) 
MEAN 
CPI 
CHANGE 
(%) 
STANDART 
DEVIATION 
CPI 
CHANGE 
(%) 
MEAN 
CPI 
CHANGE 
(%)  
STANDART 
DEVIATION 
Czech Republic January 1998 9.148754 1.167593 2.864177 2.647494 
Iceland March 2001 11.73863 12.28314 5.507201 3.639297 
South Korea April 1998 9.984134 7.785584 2.892475 1.502624 
Mexico January 1999 26.26083 33.53218 5.484609 3.291985 
Norway March 2001 5.436246 3.364343 1.865724 1.150809 
Poland October 1998 133.0069 270.3344 3.429120 2.745563 
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Table 4 (continued)   
Romania August 2005 83.45902 84.72757 5.097784 2.462453 
Serbia, Republic of January 2009 37.65800 37.05226 6.873643 3.941465 
Turkey January 2006 47.95523 29.33737 8.353109 1.806442 
United Kingdom October 1992 6.233026 1.449658 2.137496 0.956122 
 
Based on the data analysis represented on Table 4 above, the inflation rates, 
on mean, are much smaller for the industrialized economies such as Iceland, South 
Korea, Norway and the U.K. for the pre-targeting period. The same also holds for the 
EU member country, Czech Republic. On the other hand, the mean of inflation rates 
change within the range of 26-133 % for the developing economies included into the 
analysis: Mexico, Serbia, Turkey, Romania and Poland for the pre-targeting period. 
As the standard deviation is considered as a sign for the fluctuation, the standard 
deviations and volatility of the inflation rates, as expected, is much smaller for the 
industrialized countries such as the U.K., Norway, South Korea, Iceland and also for 
Czech Republic for the pre targeting period. On the other hand, the standard 
deviation for the developing economies is much higher but this might be due to the 
much higher mean values for the inflation rates of those developing economies. Once 
the post-targeting period is investigated, there is a series change for both developing 
and developed economies. The mean values of inflation rates have changed in the 
range of 2-10% for all countries. The inflation rates have declined for the developed 
economies but more importantly, the mean value of inflation rates have tremendously 
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declined in the case of developing economies. In the same respect, the standard 
deviation of inflation rates has declined as well. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Pre and Post Targeting Periods for the 
Variable of Interest Rates 
 
 
PRE-TARGETING 
PERIOD 
POST-TARGETING 
PERIOD 
COUNTRY 
NAME 
IT 
ADOPTING 
DATE 
MONEY 
MARKET 
RATE 
MEAN 
MONEY 
MARKET 
RATE 
STANDART 
DEVIATION 
MONEY 
MARKET 
RATE 
MEAN 
MONEY 
MARKET 
RATE 
STANDART 
DEVIATION 
Czech Republic January 1998 12.24317 3.325688 3.358554 3.300347 
Iceland March 2001 13.93384 10.03138 8.719615 4.543555 
South Korea April 1998 14.23000 3.988749 4.050693 2.287364 
Mexico January 1999 44.46970 25.79682 8.504531 5.475061 
Norway March 2001 7.410067 3.040252 4.087041 2.545063 
Poland October 1998 27.77745 10.47265 6.932579 5.056768 
Romania August 2005 48.73339 32.84542 6.427217 3.332708 
Serbia, Republic of January 2009 16.43268 4.803138 11.29432 2.387007 
Turkey January 2006 46.06800 48.64988 9.216716 5.391432 
United Kingdom October 1992 9.260301 4.231018 3.972105 2.368948 
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Table 5 summarizes the data analysis for the interest rate variable for the pre-
targeting and post-targeting periods separately. According to the results, the mean 
values of interest rates have been in the range of 7-14% for the developed economies 
such as the U.K., Iceland, South Korea, Norway and also for Czech Republic. The 
values of standard deviation of the interest rates have been also consistent with the 
mean values for the developed economies for the pre-targeting period. For the pre-
targeting period, the interest rates, on average, have been between the values of 16 to 
48% for the developing economies included into the analysis. On the other hand, the 
interest rates, on average, have been within the range of 2-5% for both developing 
and developed economies for the post-targeting period. This also reveals the 
noteworthy change in the interest rates prevailing in the developing economies where 
the interest rates, on average, have declined heavily. The same also holds for the 
standard deviation values. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Pre and Post Targeting Periods for the 
Variable of Output Gap 
 
 
PRE-TARGETING 
PERIOD 
POST-TARGETING 
PERIOD 
COUNTRY 
NAME 
IT 
TARGETING 
DATE 
OUTPUT 
GAP 
MEAN 
OUTPUT 
GAP 
STANDART 
DEVIATIO
N 
OUTPUT 
GAP 
MEAN 
OUTPUT 
GAP 
STANDART 
DEVIATIO
N 
Czech Republic January 1998 0.062418 5.221657 -0.018180 6.515598 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Iceland March 2001 -0.589836 2.738519 0.157844 6.794899 
South Korea April 1998 0.068378 1.215337 -0.073767 4.521881 
Mexico January 1999 0.019463 2.266165 -0.034913 2.816546 
Norway March 2001 0.015801 5.526266 -0.050147 6.624834 
Poland October 1998 0.048567 2.676881 -0.040678 4.747241 
Romania August 2005 -0.032214 
 
5.042372 0.051263 7.177189 
Serbia, Republic of January 2009 0.460737 10.78371 -1.120711 8.463583 
Turkey January 2006 -0.004142 4.172240 0.009664 
 
7.125703 
United Kingdom October 1992 -0.033023 5.079559 0.052666 4.913239 
 
On table 6, the data analysis regarding the output gap variable the results are 
not so direct and they have been more heterogeneous. First of all, for the pre-
targeting period, the smallest output gap values, on average, are calculated for 
Turkey, in absolute values but the highest values are calculated for Iceland and 
Serbia, in absolute values. For all other economies, the output gap, on average, has 
been within the range of 0.01-0.06 in absolute values for the pre-targeting periods. 
On the other hand, for the post-targeting period, still the lowest value of output gap, 
on average, belongs to Turkey, in absolute values and the highest value, on average, 
belongs to Serbia, in absolute values. For the all other economies the output gap, on 
average and in absolute values has been within the range of 0.01-0.15. More 
interestingly, the output gap has increased in the post targeting period once compared 
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with the pre-targeting period for most of the economies included into the analysis. In 
the same respect, the standard deviation values have also increased for the most of 
the economies. 
All those descriptive data findings provide supporting evidence for the 
literature and previous empirical analyses that have found out heterogeneous, various 
and mixed results of the inflation targeting regime for different economies especially 
regarding the output based variables. On the other hand, the comparison of inflation 
rates and interest rates before and after the adoption of inflation targeting has 
concluded that there is an obvious improvement on those macroeconomic variables 
after the adoption of inflation targeting for all of the economies included into the 
analysis. But these data analysis does not directly and absolutely imply that inflation 
targeting has improved the inflation rates and interest rates, on mean since there 
might be some other dynamics that might coincide with the same period. 
 
6.2. VAR Model Analysis 
 
In the initial VAR model analysis, the effect of money (or policy) rates on the 
output gap, and CPI percentage change (as inflation rate) has been investigated. In 
this study, the VAR models based findings have been similar to the findings of the 
four variable analysis case this includes interest rates, output gap, inflation rates and 
also price index. As there has not been much difference between the findings of 3-
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variabl3e case and 4-variable case and also because of the presence of price-puzzle 
problem in 3-variable case, the results regarding 4-variable case has been taken into 
consideration in commenting on the results.  
 To begin with, the positive and significant effectiveness of interest rates 
change on the inflation rates for some of the economies is regarded as an evidence 
for the presence of price-puzzle problem and therefore the price index change 
variable has been also included into the VAR model analysis. The VAR model 
analyses including the variables of output gap, inflation rates, interest rates and price 
index have been taken into consideration in this paper for each country with the pre 
and post inflation targeting periods. 
Based on the VAR analyses summary outputs for the case of Czech Republic, 
there has no overall statistical significance in none of the models for the pre-targeting 
period. In case of Czech Republic for the post-targeting period, the first and second 
lags of output gap have been found separately effective on actual output gap in a 
negative way. Regarding the inflation rates it is found out that first lag of inflation 
rates have positive effect on actual inflation rates implying that one lag could be 
deterministic on the expectations of the public about the inflation rates. With respect 
to the money market rates, it is seen that both first and second lags of interest rates 
have significant and positive effect on actual interest rates. These all show that the 
past values of output gap, inflation rates and interest rates have been significant 
influence on their actual values implying that the past values affect the current values 
in case of Czech Republic for the period of post-targeting. But the results imply that 
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there is no significant effect of money market rates on output gap and inflation rates 
separately for the post-targeting period for Czech Republic.  
The similar findings have been also captured for the case of Iceland. For the 
pre-targeting period, the first lag and second lag of output gap itself have been found 
out as effective on output gap. 
 But there has not been any significant effect of lagged values of interest rates 
and inflation rates on their actual values for the pre-targeting period. The same 
conclusion also holds for the model of interest rates. For the post-targeting period, 
the effects of output gap with its lagged values on its actual value have been found 
out as significant and also inflation rates with the first lag has been positively 
effective on its actual values. With respect to the money market rates, both the first 
and second lags have been found out as negatively effective on actual money market 
rates for post-targeting period in case of Iceland. 
In case of South Korea analysis, the negative effects of the first and second 
lags of output gap on actual gap have been also calculated for the pre-targeting 
period. For the inflation rates of pre-targeting period, the first lag has been found out 
as positively effective on the actual inflation rates. For the post-targeting period, the 
same conclusions regarding the output gap and inflation rates hold but for post-
targeting period, it is seen that the first lag of money market rates has been also 
positively influential on its actual value. 
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In case of Mexico, for the pre-targeting period it is seen that both the first and 
second lags of output gap have been negatively influential on the actual, current 
output gap implying that the output gap is tended to decline if the output gap has 
been high in the previous periods. This is also interpreted as a moving toward the 
trend for the output gap rather than a continuous increase or decrease on output gap. 
For the pre-targeting period, the first lag of inflation rates has been found out as 
positively effective on current inflation rates. On the other hand, it is seen that the 
first lag of money market rates has positive but second lag has negative effect on 
current money market rates. This implies that there is a movement toward the trend 
after two periods. For the post-targeting period, it is seen that only the first lag of 
output gap has significant and negative effect on current output gap. Regarding the 
inflation rates, the first lag has positive but second lag has negative effects on current 
inflation rates. For the money market rates, the first lag has positive but second lag 
has no effect on current money market rates.  
In case of Norway, the same conclusions have been drawn for the output gap 
for the pre-targeting period meaning that both the first and second lags have negative 
and significant effect on the current output gap.  
The inflation rates and policy rates VAR models have been found out as 
statistically insignificant. For the period of post-targeting, the negative effect of first 
lag on current output lag stays the same but this time effect of second lag disappears. 
But the second lag of inflation rates becomes negative and significant besides the 
positive effects of the first lag on the inflation rates. Regarding the policy rates, the 
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effect of the first lag disappears but this time the second lag has been found out as 
having positive effect on actual policy rates. 
In case of Poland also both first and second lag of output gap have been found 
out as having negative effect on their current values for pre-targeting period. There is 
no statistical significance for the inflation rate model but the first lag of money 
market rates have negative effect on its current value for pre-targeting period. 
Regarding the period after the adoption of inflation targeting, the same effect of lag 
values of variables hold more or less for the post-targeting period. But this time, for 
the period of post-targeting, the effect of first lag of inflation rates on actual values is 
found out as positive and significant.  
In case of Romania, the negative effects of both the first and second lags of 
output gap on the current output gap also hold for the pre-targeting period. In the 
same respect, the first lag of inflation rates has been found out as having positive 
effect on current inflation rates as it also holds for the other economies taken into 
consideration in this study. But there is not any significant effect of lagged values of 
money market rates on the current rates. For the post-targeting period in Romania 
case analysis, the same conclusions gathered for output gap analysis but this time 
both inflation rates and money market rates models are found out insignificant 
implying that there is no effect of previous values of inflation rates and money 
market rates on their actual values. 
In case of Serbia, there has not been any significant effect of lagged values of 
output gap on its current value for the pre-targeting period and this also holds for the 
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inflation rates model implying that there is no effect of lag values of inflation rates on 
the current value. But the effect of first lag of money market rates on its current value 
has been significant and positive. For the post-targeting period, the effects of first 
lagged values of both inflation rates and money market rates on their current value 
are positive on their own current values but this time it is found out that only the 
second lag value of output gap has negative effect on its current values. 
In case of Turkey, for the pre-targeting period only the first lag of output gap 
has negative and significant effect on its current value. Regarding the inflation rates, 
the positive effect of the first lag value of itself also holds for the case of Turkey but 
it is found out that both the first and second lagged values of policy rates have 
negative effect on its current value for the pre-targeting period. For the post-targeting 
period, the effect of the first lag of output gap on its current value as being negative 
stays the same but the effect of lagged values of inflation rates on their current values 
disappear. Regarding the policy rate, this time the effect of the first lag of policy rates 
turns out as positive and the second lag becomes statistically insignificant. But there 
is no statistical significance on the model of inflation rates implying that there is no 
effect of lag values on the current value of inflation rates. In this respect, after the 
adoption of inflation targeting, it could be hypothesized that the macroeconomic 
indicators of Turkey reveal trends much more similar to the ones of the other 
inflation targeting economies. 
In case of the U.K., for the pre-targeting period none of the VAR models is 
statistically significant implying that none of those variables‟ lag values determine 
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the current value of those macroeconomic indicators. On the other hand, both the first 
and second lags of output gap have been found out as having negative and significant 
effect on current value of output gap. For both pre and post targeting periods, there 
has not been ay effect of lagged values of inflation rates on its current values. 
However, the first lag of money market rates has negative effect on current money 
market rates for the period of post inflation targeting. 
These entire VAR model results imply that the output gap generally has been 
affected its past values negatively in case of both early adopters such as the U.K. and 
also new adopters such as Serbia for the post-inflation targeting period. Regarding 
the inflation rates, the effect of the lagged values on current values have been 
generally positive and significant for almost all countries included in the analysis for 
both pre and post inflation targeting framework implementation. On the other hand, 
the lagged of money market /policy rate variable on its current values have been 
different for different economies and for pre and post inflation targeting regimes 
implying that the differences in monetary policy could be reflected on the results as 
well. 
 
6.3. Impulse Response Functions 
 
The impulse response functions reveal how the shocks to the specific variable 
affect the volatility and values of other variables. In this study, how the shocks to the 
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money market /policy rates would influence the output gap and inflation rates before 
and after the adoption of inflation targeting has been investigated for every country 
included into the analysis. 
To begin with, the effects of shocks to the interest rates on the output gap 
have been in a smaller range and much more limited to a shorter period. 
In case of Czech Republic, it is seen that the effects of shocks to the money 
market rates on output gap are not seen significantly. But more importantly, the 
impulse response function graphical analysis reveals that the effect of shocks to 
money market rates on output gap lasts for almost 14 periods for the pre-targeting 
period. On the other hand, it is seen that the effect of money market shocks on output 
gap only lasts for at most 8 periods for post-targeting period. This reveals that in 
post-targeting period, the effects of shocks stay more temporary. The figure below 
shows the response of output gap to money market rate for Czech Republic 
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PRE IT PERIOD POST IT PERIOD 
Czech Republic 
 
Czech Republic 
 
 
Figure 1: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for Czech Republic 
 
In case of Iceland, the effects of shocks to the money market rates on output 
gap could be compared in a more obvious way for the pre and post inflation targeting 
periods as the models are found out as statistically significant. In the pre-targeting 
period, the effects of shock on the output gap declines through time but the 
magnitude of the initial effect of shock is much higher than it has been for the post-
targeting period. More importantly, the duration of the effect of shock on output is 
much longer in case of pre-targeting period than the post-targeting one. The figure 2 
represents the response of output gap to money market rate for Iceland. 
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Iceland 
 
Iceland 
 
 
Figure 2: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for Iceland 
 In case of South Korea, the magnitude of the effect of shock on output gap 
does not change much between pre and post targeting periods but the duration of the 
effect of shock on output gap has been much longer in case of pre-targeting period 
than the post-targeting one. It can be seen that the response of output gap to money 
market rate for South Korea in the following figure. 
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South Korea  
 
South Korea  
 
Figure 3: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for South Korea 
In case of Mexico, there could not be found out any significant difference 
between pre and post inflation targeting periods although the effect of shock on 
output gap seems slightly smoother in case of post-targeting period once compared to 
the pre-targeting period because the output gap moves within a lower range in the 
case of post-targeting period. Figure 4 shows the response of output gap to money 
market rate for Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
59 
   
PRE IT PERIOD POST IT PERIOD 
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Mexico 
 
Figure 4: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for Mexico 
In case of Norway, the results seem contradicting with the findings relevant 
for the other economies. According to the impulse response analysis, the effect of 
shocks to money market rates on output gap moves within a larger range and for a 
longer duration in the case of post-targeting period than it does in the case of pre-
targeting period. The response of output gap to money market rate for Norway can be 
seen in figure 5. 
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Norway 
 
Figure 5: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for Norway 
Contradicting findings hold for the case of Romania. In case of Romania both 
the magnitude of the effect on output gap and also duration of the effect on output 
gap have been much higher for the post inflation targeting period than the pre 
targeting period. In the case of Republic of Serbia, the pre-targeting period is seen as 
insignificant for the output gap model but for the post targeting it is seen as 
significant and duration of shock takes more in case of post-targeting and there is 
high volatility as well. The response of output gap to money market rate for the case 
of Romania and the case of Republic of Serbia can be seen in figure 6. 
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Romania 
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Figure 6: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for Romania and 
Republic of Serbia 
In case of Poland, the magnitude of the effect of money market shock on output gap 
does no change much between pre and post targeting periods but the duration of the 
effects of shock on output gap is much lower in case of post inflation targeting 
period. The figure 7 represents the response of output gap to money market rate for 
the case of Poland. 
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Figure 7: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for Poland 
In case of Turkey, the post-targeting regime obviously improves the negative 
effects of possible money market shocks into the economy. According to the impulse 
response analysis, the effects of shocks on output gap of Turkey last for a shorter 
period of time but the magnitude of effects of shocks on output are calculated as not 
much different between pre and post targeting periods. The following figure serves 
the response of output gap to money market rate for the case of Turkey. 
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Turkey 
 
Figure 8: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for Turkey 
But in case of the United Kingdom the positive change on the effectiveness of 
shocks on the output has been much clear in the case of post-targeting period. The 
duration of shock are measured as smaller in case of post inflation targeting period. 
The figure 9 indicates the response of output gap to money market rate for the case of 
United Kingdom. 
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Figure 9: Response of Output Gap to Money Market Rate for United Kingdom 
Once the effects of money market shocks on the inflation rates have been 
investigated for the same economies for both periods of pre and post inflation 
targeting, the results also provide contradicting and different interpretations for 
different economies.  
To start with, in case of Czech Republic the duration of the effect on inflation 
rates become shorter respectively in the event of post-targeting period even if it is 
seen that the effects of shocks to the money market rates on inflation rates are not 
seen significantly. The figure below shows the response of inflation rate to money 
market rate for Czech Republic. 
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Figure 10: Response of Inflation Rate to Money Market Rate for Czech 
Republic 
The same conclusions also hold for the case of Iceland and Romania where 
the fluctuations of inflation rates takes less period for the post inflation targeting 
period. The response of inflation rate to money market rate for the case of Iceland 
and Romania can be seen in figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Response of Inflation Rate to Money Market Rate for Iceland and 
Romania 
On the other hand, in case of South Korea although the magnitude of effect of 
shocks stays within a more narrow range in case of post-targeting, the duration of the 
effect of shock on inflation rates has been much longer once compared to the pre-
targeting period. The figure 12 shows the response of inflation rate to money market 
rate for the case of South Korea. 
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Figure 12: Response of Inflation Rate to Money Market Rate for South Korea 
The reverse holds in case of Mexico. For Mexico case it is found out that the 
magnitude of the effect of shock on inflation rates does not change much differ 
among pre and post targeting periods but the duration of the effect of shock is much 
shorter in case of post-targeting period. The response of inflation rate to money 
market rate for the case of Mexico can be seen in the following figure. 
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Figure 13: Response of Inflation Rate to Money Market Rate for Mexico 
 On the other hand, in case of Norway the post-targeting period demonstrates 
a longer duration of the crisis for the effect of shocks on inflation rates. This finding 
contradicts with the findings gathered in the case of other economies. The figure 14 
represents the response of inflation rate to money market rate for Norway. 
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Figure 14: Response of Inflation Rate to Money Market Rate for Norway 
In case of Poland, the duration of the effects on inflation rates does not 
change much between pre and post inflation targeting periods. The pre-targeting 
period analysis is found out as insignificant but the model found out as significant in 
case of post-targeting. The following figure indicates the response of inflation rate to 
money market rate for the case of Poland. 
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Figure 15: Response of Inflation Rate to Money Market Rate for Poland 
In case of Republic of Serbia, the impulse response analysis reveals that the 
effects of money market shocks on inflation rates stay for a much longer duration 
after the adoption of inflation targeting regime. Different from other analyses for 
other economies, this time the inflation rates model is not significant in case of post-
targeting. The response of inflation rate to money market rate for the case of 
Republic of Serbia is showed in the figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Response of Inflation Rate to Money Market Rate for Republic of 
Serbia 
On the other hand, in case of Turkey and the U.K., the effect of shocks to the 
money market rates on the inflation rates has moved for a shorter period of time after 
the adoption of inflation targeting regime. For the case of Turkey, the model of pre-
targeting period has been found out as significant but the model of post-targeting 
period has been found out as insignificant. This implies that post inflation targeting 
might eliminate the effect of policy rates on inflation rates. But the reverse holds for 
the case of the U.K.. After inflation targeting adoption, the insignificant model on 
inflation rates become statistically significant implying that there might be significant 
effect of money market rates on inflation rates after the adoption of inflation 
targeting. The figure 17 illustrates the response of inflation rate to money market rate 
for the case of Turkey and United Kingdom. 
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Figure 17: Response of Inflation Rate to Money Market Rate for Turkey and 
United Kingdom 
All those findings reveal that the effects of inflation targeting regime on the 
macroeconomic outlook and also the general interaction among different 
macroeconomic indicators (output gap, interest rates and inflation rates) do not differ 
much once compared to the pre-targeting period. More importantly, the results imply 
that for almost all economies (except Turkey and Romania) the effect of interest rates 
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on inflation rates have been found out statistically significant for the post-targeting 
period regardless of the effect for the pre-targeting period implying that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy on inflation rates has been turned out to be 
significant after the adoption of inflation targeting framework. The same conclusion 
also holds for the effectiveness of monetary policy on output gap. After the adoption 
of inflation targeting framework, the effectiveness of monetary policy on output gap 
has been calculated as statistically significant although it has not been found out as 
significantly effective for the economies of Czech Republic, Republic of Serbia and 
the U.K. for the pre-targeting period.  dddddddddddddddddddddddddddd
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The world economies since Great Depression have tried different monetary 
policy tools and framework and regimes in order to handle with the changing 
economic structure. As the globalization has increased owing to the liberalization 
of many economies after Cold War, more and more economies have been 
integrated into the global marketplace and the interconnectedness among different 
economic units have increased as well. Although the global integration of 
economies has created an economic environment which includes many growth and 
development opportunities, this has also brought many risks for the economies. 
The exchange rates are proved to be hard to control and eventually the fixed 
exchange rate regime has been abandoned and exchange rates are allowed to freely 
float without direct control of Central Bank. Moreover, increasing inflation and 
price instability have been found out as detrimental on the economic growth and 
general outlook since 1970s. 
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Those changes taking place in the economic environment have caused the 
economic authorities to try different policy approaches ranging from Gold 
Standard to inflation targeting. Since 1990s, the most heavily accepted and 
implemented policy approach has emerged as the inflation targeting regime. 
Although it is argued that Central Banks cannot actually control the inflation rates 
and even target the desired inflation rates, many studies have favored the direct 
and indirect importance of inflation targeting regime in constituting the stability in 
the macro outlook of any economy. However, there is still no consensus on the 
actual effectiveness of inflation targeting regime on the macroeconomic outlook 
once compared to the pre-targeting period. There have been mixed results about 
the comparison of performances of targeting and non-targeting economies. Also, 
the most of the literature still focuses on the direct effect of inflation targeting 
regime on levels and volatility of inflation rates. But there is still not enough 
literature about the direct and indirect effectiveness of inflation targeting regime on 
macroeconomic growth and other indicators. In order to fulfill this gap in the 
literature, this study has focused on how the performance of inflation targeting 
economies has changed before and after the adoption of inflation targeting regime. 
The descriptive data analysis for the pre-targeting and post-targeting period has 
revealed that there is a certain influence of adoption of inflation targeting regime 
on the interest rates and inflation rates especially. Based on the numerical analysis, 
the interest rates and inflation rates have declined significantly for both developing 
and developed economies after the adoption of inflation targeting. Especially there 
is a noteworthy decline in the interest rates and inflation rates for the developing 
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economies after the adoption of inflation targeting once compared to the pre-
targeting period. But the numerical analysis does not reveal any significant change 
on output gap between the pre and post period. VAR model analysis has revealed 
that there is not a direct effect of inflation targeting regime on the macroeconomic 
indicators but based on the impulse response functions analysis, there is a certain 
change on the effects of shocks on macroeconomic indicators, output gap and 
inflation rates under the inflation targeting regime. But the change has not been 
found out as desirable for every country in the post-targeting period. 
Especially, for the economies of the U.K. and Turkey, there has been an 
obvious decline in the duration and magnitude of the effects of possible shocks on 
the output gap and inflation rates once those economies have adopted the inflation 
targeting regime. On the other hand, the positive outcome would not be obtained 
for the economies of Norway and Serbia. These findings have signaled that the 
effects of shocks on macroeconomic indicators change between pre and post 
targeting periods but in which direction these changes take place is assumed to be 
dependent on differences about the macroeconomic structure of the economies and 
how the economy has implemented the inflation targeting regime. Once the 
differences among countries for the post-targeting period is investigated, for the 
effects of shock on both output gap and also inflation rates have been found out as 
heterogeneous and various implying that the inflation targeting regime could result 
in differences in the responsiveness of different economies to the shocks. Those 
findings provide supporting evidence for the previous literature that have 
concluded the effectiveness of inflation is not clear cut and the heterogeneous 
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results have also obtained among analysis of different economies as the previous 
literature has suggested. In this respect, it is concluded that the inflation targeting 
regime could be evaluated in a way that the responsiveness of the economy to the 
shocks could be improved under the inflation targeting regime but this might 
depend on many conditions prevailing in the economy. Therefore, this area of 
search requires a much more detailed analysis. 
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions of Czech for Pre Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions of Czech for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions of Iceland for Pre Inflation Targeting 
  
 
89 
   
Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions of Iceland for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions of Korea for Pre Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions of Korea for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions of Mexico for Pre Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions of Mexico for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions of Norway for Pre Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 10: Impulse Response Functions of Norway for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 11: Impulse Response Functions of Poland for Pre Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 12: Impulse Response Functions of Poland for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 13: Impulse Response Functions of Romania for Pre Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 14: Impulse Response Functions of Romania for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 15: Impulse Response Functions of Republic of Serbia for Pre  Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 16: Impulse Response Functions of Republic of Serbia for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 17:  Impulse Response Functions of Turkey for Pre Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 18: Impulse Response Functions of Turkey for Post Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 19: Impulse Response Functions of United Kingdom for Pre Inflation Targeting 
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Figure 20: Impulse Response Functions of United Kingdom for Post Inflation Targeting 
